INTRODUCTION
In the United States, there has been fierce debate over the Second Amendment and the scope of the right that it protects. Pro-gun enthusiasts as well as some academics and historians have fervently argued that the Second Amendment protects an individual's right to bear arms. 4 Subscribing to the "individual rights" view, they argue that the Second Amendment grants an individual the right to possess and use firearms for any purpose, subject only 7. See Silveira, 312 F.3d at 1060. There is a third interpretation of the Second Amendment that is also related to the militia, referred to as the limited individual rights group. See id. This group believes that the Second Amendment does confer an individual right to bear arms so long as that possession bears a reasonable relationship to militia service. Id. While both the collective rights and limited individual rights views are tied to the militia, the collective rights view is much more predominant than the individual rights view. See id. to limited government regulation. 5 On the other side of the debate are gun control advocates, other academics and scholars who believe that the Second Amendment only protects the right to bear arms when related to a wellregulated state militia. 6 Their view can be characterized as the "collective rights" interpretation of the Second Amendment. 7 This group believes that the Second Amendment protects the people's right to maintain effective state militias, but does not afford any type of individual right to own or possess weapons. 8 Despite all the debate over the Second Amendment, the Supreme Court has been surprisingly silent over the years on the scope of the right guaranteed by the Second Amendment. In United States v. Miller, 9 the lone case to specifically address the Second Amendment, the Court held that the Second Amendment did not protect possession of a sawed-off shotgun since the gun was not suitable for use in the militia. 10 Because the Court's rather cryptic holding only addressed the sawed-off shotgun at issue and was silent as to whether there were any guns that would be protected, both proponents of the individual rights view and of the collective rights view have argued that Miller supports their positions.
11
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's relatively limited jurisprudence interpreting the Second Amendment, until last year, the great majority of federal circuit courts interpreted the Second Amendment to protect the right to bear arms only in connection with a well-regulated militia, citing Miller in support of their holdings.
12 For decades, the Department of Justice agreed with the militia interpretation as well. 13 Thus, while academics, National Rifle Association ("NRA") members, gun control advocates, and politicians feverishly argue over what the Second Amendment means, in the courts at least, it was well settled that the Second Amendment only protected a right to bear arms having some relation to a well-regulated militia. This position also was clear among federal prosecutors who argued the militia interpretation when prosecuting convictions under federal gun laws.
A crucial turning point in the legal debate on the Second Amendment occurred in 2001 when the Fifth Circuit decided United States v. Emerson.
14 While that case upheld the defendant's conviction for possessing a firearm while subject to a domestic violence restraining order in violation of a federal statute, for the first time a federal circuit court found that the Second Amendment more broadly protected an individual's right to bear arms. 15 Soon after Emerson was decided, Attorney General John Ashcroft, ignoring other federal court precedent and prior Department of Justice policy, officially switched the Department of Justice's stance on the Second Amendment, agreeing with the Fifth Circuit that the Second Amendment more broadly protects the rights of individuals.
16
Ashcroft's policy switch has prompted criminal defense lawyers throughout the country to move federal court judges to dismiss the gun charges against their clients, based on the Department's new position that the Second Amendment more broadly protects the rights of individuals. 17 Government lawyers have been put in a conflicted position since, when prosecuting a conviction under a gun law, they have to essentially argue against themselves, promoting the individual rights view of the Justice Department, while at the same time arguing to uphold federal gun laws.
Thus far, these Second Amendment challenges have been rejected by federal courts, largely because the appellate court precedent in every circuit but the Fifth Circuit still interprets the Second Amendment under the militia interpretation. 18 However, this Comment argues that Ashcroft's policy switch may weaken the government's ability to prosecute Second Amendment challenges, putting our nation's gun laws at risk of being declared unconstitutional.
Part I of this Comment will provide background on how the courts have handled Second Amendment claims by discussing the Supreme Court's and federal courts' Second Amendment jurisprudence. Part II will discuss how the Department of Justice has interpreted the Second Amendment in the past when prosecuting Second Amendment challenges and how Ashcroft officially changed the government's position on the Second Amendment. Finally, Part III will discuss how Ashcroft's individual rights interpretation may make our nation's gun laws vulnerable to attack. It will examine Second Amendment challenges that have arisen since the government's change in interpretation, discuss how courts, generally speaking, handle constitutional claims, and explore the conflicted position the new policy puts federal prosecutors in when handling these challenges.
I. COURTS AND THE SECOND AMENDMENT

A. The Supreme Court and the Second Amendment
The Supreme Court has considered a direct Second Amendment challenge to a federal firearms statute just once in United States v. Miller. 19 In Miller, the government appealed to the Supreme Court after the United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas dismissed indictments charging Defendants in violation of the National Firearms Act for transporting an unregistered double barrel 12-gauge shotgun in interstate commerce. 20 The district court held that the section of the Act making it unlawful to transport an unregistered firearm in interstate commerce was unconstitutional. 21 The Supreme Court reversed the district court's ruling, holding that the Second Amendment did not protect possession of the weapon at issue because it was not suitable for use in the militia. 22 In the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or use of a "shotgun having a barrel of less than eighteen inches in length" at this time has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument.
23
The Court discussed the role of the militia at the time the Constitution was adopted, stating that "[w]ith obvious purpose to assure the continuation and render possible the effectiveness of such forces the declaration and guarantee of the Second Amendment were made. It must be interpreted and applied with that end in view." 24 There is under our decisions no reason why stiff state laws governing the purchase and possession of pistols may not be enacted. There is no reason why pistols may not be barred from anyone with a police record. There is no reason why a state may not require a purchaser of a pistol to pass a psychiatric test. There is no reason why all pistols should not be barred to everyone except the police.
33
Douglas' strong language regarding the regulation of pistols seems to indicate that he would support a collective rights interpretation of the Second Amendment and does not believe the Second Amendment provides any fundamental individual right to bear arms. Next, the Ninth Circuit discusses Justice Stevens' dissent in United States v. Lopez, 34 in which the Court held that Congress exceeded its authority under the Commerce Clause by enacting the Gun Free School Zones Act. 35 The Ninth Circuit argues that Justice Stevens' dissent in Lopez, while not mentioning the Second Amendment, "strongly implied that he believes that it offers no obstacles to the federal government's ability to regulate firearms . . . ." 36 The court quotes Stevens' dissent:
Guns are both articles of commerce and articles that can be used to restrain commerce. Their possession is the consequence, either directly or indirectly, of commercial activity. In my judgment, Congress' power to regulate commerce in firearms includes the power to prohibit possession of guns at any location because of their potentially harmful use . . . .
37
The Ninth Circuit then points to Justice Thomas This Court has not had recent occasion to consider the nature of the substantive right safeguarded by the Second Amendment. If, however, the Second Amendment is read to confer a personal right to "keep and bear arms," a colorable argument exists that the Federal Government's regulatory scheme, at least as it pertains to the purely intrastate sale or possession of firearms, runs afoul of that Amendment's protections. As the parties did not raise this argument, however, we need not consider it here. Perhaps, at some future date, this Court will have the opportunity to determine whether Justice Story was correct when he wrote that the right to bear arms "has justly been considered, as the palladium of the liberties of a republic." 40 Finally, the Ninth Circuit points out Chief Justice Warren Burger's highly publicized comments about the Second Amendment that he made after his retirement:
In an interview, former Chief Justice Burger stated that the traditional individual rights view was: "one of the greatest pieces of fraud, I repeat the word 'fraud,' on the American public by special interest groups that I've ever seen in my lifetime. The real purpose of the Second Amendment was to ensure that state armies-the militia-would be maintained for the defense of the state. The very language of the Second Amendment refutes any argument that it was intended to guarantee every citizen an unfettered right to any kind of weapon he or she desires."
41
In sum, although the exact scope of the right protected by the Second Amendment is not entirely clear from the Supreme Court's limited jurisprudence on the Second Amendment, the Court's holding in Miller and its dicta in Lewis strongly imply that the Second Amendment right must relate to the militia in some way, and that the Court rejects the individual rights view of the Second Amendment. As one of the inferior federal courts subject to the Supreme Court's precedents, we have neither the license nor the inclination to engage in such freewheeling presumptuousness. In any event, this court has on several occasions emphasized that the Second Amendment furnishes no absolute right to firearms. Federal attempts at firearms regulation have also consistently withstood challenge under the Second Amendment. (9), which prohibits the possession of firearms by people who are subject to a domestic violence order or who have been convicted of domestic violence. 50 Finally, an appellate court has relied on Miller and Lewis in upholding Appellant's conviction for violating 18 U.S.C.S. § § 922(g)(1)(k), prohibiting possession of firearms after a felony conviction and possession of firearms with obliterated serial numbers. 51 Despite substantial appellate precedent supporting the militia view of the Second Amendment, in Emerson, the Fifth Circuit became the first federal appellate court to interpret the Second Amendment as granting an individual right to bear arms. 52 Defendant, Timothy Joe Emerson, was arrested after he pulled a Beretta pistol from his desk drawer, cocked it and pointed it at his wife and daughter. 53 He was indicted for violating 18 U.S.C.S. § 922(g)(8), part of the federal Violence Against Women Act that prohibited a person subject to a domestic violence restraining order from possessing a firearm while subject to that order. The court qualified this individual right to bear arms stating that it "does not mean that those rights may never be made subject to any limited, narrowly tailored specific exceptions or restrictions for particular cases that are reasonable and not inconsistent with the right of Americans generally to individually keep and bear their private arms as historically understood in this country." 58 In applying the "individual rights view" to Emerson, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the restraining order at issue, "is sufficient, albeit likely minimally so, to support the deprivation, while it remains in effect, of the defendant's Second Amendment rights." 59 In reaching its conclusion that the Second Amendment protects individual rights, the Emerson court examined the government's brief in the Miller case. 60 It argued that the government made two legal arguments in its brief. First, the right secured by the Second Amendment is "only one which exists where the arms are borne in the militia or some other military organization provided for by law and intended for the protection of the state."
B. Federal Circuit Courts and the Second Amendment
61 Second, the government argued:
While some courts have said that the right to bear arms includes the right of the individual to have them for the protection of his person and property as well as the right of the people to bear them collectively, the cases are unanimous in holding that the term "arms" as used in constitutional provisions refers only to those weapons which are ordinarily used for military or public defense purposes and does not relate to those weapons which are commonly used by criminals. . . . That the foregoing cases conclusively establish that the Second Amendment has relation only to the right of the people to keep and bear arms for lawful purposes and does not conceivably relate to weapons of the type referred to in the National Firearms Act cannot be doubted. Sawedoff shotguns, sawed-off rifles and machine guns are clearly weapons which can have no legitimate use in the hands of private individuals. The Emerson court concluded that the Miller case was decided upon the government's second argument. 63 The court argued that the Miller Court does not support a militia interpretation. 64 However, then the Fifth Circuit pointed out that it did not base its analysis on the assumption that the Miller Court did, in fact, support the individual rights interpretation of the Second Amendment as opposed to a militia interpretation. 65 Because the court believed that Miller did not resolve the issue, it analyzed the Second Amendment's history and language in concluding that the Second Amendment more broadly protects the rights of individuals. 66 Across the nation, pro-gun enthusiasts and proponents of the individual rights view celebrated the Fifth Circuit's opinion although any hope they had that the other federal circuit courts would accept the individual rights view was short-lived.
Despite 68 It upheld Defendant's conviction for violating the state's assault weapon ban, concluding that the Second Amendment confers a collective right to arm state militias, not an individual, personal right to possess guns. 69 As a result, it held that individuals lack standing to assert Second Amendment challenges. 70 Like the Emerson court, the Ninth Circuit took an in-depth review of the Second Amendment. In reaching its conclusion, the court extensively examined Supreme Court discussion of the Second Amendment, and it noted other federal circuit courts' interpretations of the Second Amendment, including the Emerson opinion. 71 The court conceded that Miller "did not . . . definitively resolve the nature of the right that the Second Amendment establishes." 72 Therefore, the court's decision was "guided by additional factors-the text and structure of the amendment, an examination of the materials reflecting the historical context in which it was adopted, and a review of the deliberations that preceded the enactment of the amendment-considered in a manner that comports with the rationale of Miller."
73
In concluding that the collective rights militia view was the correct interpretation of the Second Amendment, the Silveira court rejected the Fifth Circuit's analysis of Miller:
In the view of the Emerson court, the Supreme Court's opinion in Miller adopted the government's second argument, and not its first, which is not an unreasonable conclusion. That conclusion does not, however, lead to the result the Fifth Circuit then reaches. In our view, the government's second argument supports . . . the [militia interpretation], but not the traditional individual rights doctrine that the Fifth Circuit adopts. Moreover, in an attempt to reconcile its position with Miller, the Fifth Circuit modifies that doctrine by asserting that certain undefined types of arms are excluded from the amendment's coverage. Miller suggests that the arms protected by the amendment, if any, are those related to militia service, but Emerson strays far from that view. While it is unclear precisely what types of arms the Fifth Circuit would deem included or excluded, Emerson's conclusion that the Second Amendment protects private gun ownership so long as the weapons have "legitimate use in the hands of private individuals," represents a far different approach from that stated in Miller. In our view, the Fifth Circuit's decision is incompatible with the Supreme Court ruling. 74 
II. ATTORNEY GENERAL ASHCROFT AND THE SECOND AMENDMENT
A. Department of Justice Policy: Pre-Emerson
Prior to Emerson, the Department of Justice followed the majority of federal courts, taking the position that the Second Amendment protects only gun possession related to the preservation of a well-regulated militia. 75 In fact, while Emerson was pending before the Fifth Circuit, the Department of Justice filed an amicus curiae brief on behalf of the United States of America. A portion of this brief was restated in an ethics complaint made against Ashcroft to the Inspector General. 76 In it the government argued:
In striking down Section 922(g) (8) Further, the complaint pointed out that while it would have been inappropriate for any attorney representing the United States to write such a letter to the NRA, "Mr. Ashcroft's position as Attorney General exacerbates these improprieties, because of his influence, the publicity attendant to his remarks, and the fact that he can reasonably be perceived as stating the official legal position of the United States." Does not mean that reasonable restrictions cannot be imposed to prevent unfit persons from possessing firearms or to restrict possession of firearms particularly suited to criminal misuse. In my view, the Emerson opinion, and the balance it strikes, generally reflects the correct understanding of the Second Amendment. . . . The Department can and will continue to defend vigorously the constitutionality, under the Second Amendment, of all existing federal firearms laws. The Department has a solemn obligation both to enforce federal law and to respect the constitutional rights guaranteed to Americans.
87
Ashcroft's memorandum clearly requires federal prosecutors to promote the "individual rights" view he supports when arguing gun conviction cases 2003 [T]he current position of the United States . . . is that the Second Amendment more broadly protects the rights of individuals, including persons who are not members of any militia or engaged in active military service or training, to possess and bear their own firearms, subject to reasonable restrictions designed to prevent possession by unfit persons or to restrict the possession of types of firearms that are particularly suited to criminal misuse. 88 This was the first time the Department of Justice, speaking for the federal government, made clear in a formal filing its position that the Second Amendment grants an individual the right to bear arms. 89 Olson acknowledged that the briefs represented a shift in government policy since, when the two cases were argued before separate appellate courts, "the government argued that the Second Amendment protects only such acts of firearm possession as are reasonably related to the preservation or efficiency of the militia." These briefs provide no guidance regarding the scope of the right protected by the government's new individual rights interpretation. Clearly, the government believes that the Second Amendment does not protect an individual who is subject to a domestic violence restraining order, nor does it allow an individual to possess a machine gun. It is interesting that Olson pointedly notifies the Court that no federal gun law has been found to violate the Second Amendment. 95 Does that mean that while espousing the individual rights view, in reality, the government believes that no person's individual right would be impeded by a federal gun statute? While the Supreme Court refused to hear both Emerson and Haney, the debate over the Second Amendment and whether it protects an individual right to keep and bear arms has continued with renewed fervor since Emerson and the Department of Justice's official switch in policy. 96 Although Ashcroft may have intended the change in policy to be little more than a political move to placate supporters of the individual rights view, the policy may weaken the government's ability to prosecute Second Amendment challenges to our nation's gun laws.
III. EFFECTS OF ASHCROFT'S POLICY SWITCH
A. Defendants Across the Country Cite the New Policy as a Defense to Gun Convictions
Since the Department of Justice's policy switch, criminal defense lawyers in firearm prosecutions around the country have been quick to cite the government's individual rights interpretation in arguing that their clients'
